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THE DECISION TO OWN A FOREIGN ENTERPRISE *
Stephen Hymer
The international operations of firms can take many forms.

Some

firms own and control enterprises in foreign countries; some have only
indirect contacts through international markets; others have something
in between; a minority interest, a licensing agreement, participation in
I'

a cartel, tacit collusion, etc.

The purpose of this essay is to

analyze some factors which determin1:: how much ownership and control is
profitable, in a given instance.
The approach is based on Coase's insight that the firm is an
alternative to the market.

"Outside the firm, price movements direct

production, which is coordinated through a series of exchange transactions
on the market.

Hithin the firm, these market transactions are eliminated

)

and in place of the complicated market structure with exchange transactions
II

is substituted the entrepreneur coordinator, who directs production.

1

Given this assumption, Coase focused attention on market imperfections which
lead firms to substitute centralized bureaucratic decision-making for decentralized market decisions.

Similarly, we can in the international context,

compare the efficiency of the multinational firm relative to international
markets as a means of providing incentives, transmitting information and
setting prices.

In this way we hope to analyze some of the conditions in

which it is profitable to confederate, merge, or absorb a foreign customer,
supplier or competitor.
Under this approach, we view direct foreign investment as an instrument of international.business organization.

Investing abroad is profitable,

we hypothesize, because it allows a firm to increase its self-containment
and thereby diminish uncertainty and reduce the threats of competition.
We thus relate the theory of international capital movements to

- 2

the theory of prices and production via the theory of the organization
of the firm.

The arguments are strai;>.htfon1ard and based on familiar

tools of economic analysis; the novelty, if any, lies in the fact that
the theory of the firm has not as yet been applied to the problem of
international capital movements to anyFhere near the fullest extent
possible.

No attempt at a conprehensive treatnent is made here; instead

(

a few examples - in particular the prol,lems of sellinr; technology or
buying rau materials are exa;nined in detail in order to illustrate the
problem.
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I
Before He analyze the reasons for direct investuent, we might review
a few important facts.

The bull: of United States direct investment is

accounted for by only a feu firms - 60~~ by the fifty largest investors,

70t~ by the hundred largest, 90% by the three hundred largest 2- uhich by
and large tend to be in hir;hly concentrated industries.
ulation of ninety leading investors

A special tab

shous, for example, that approximately

40% are in industries ,,here the cor:centrntion ratio ,ms greater than 75%,
(for the United States as a ,-,hole, only G? of the total value of ship
ments occurs in industries uherc concentration is this hir,h). 3

A study

by Dunning of American investments in the United Kingdom came up ,-1ith
the striking conclusion that nearly every Anerican branclt plant uas in

an industry where it uns the domina::t producer or one of a small number

of producers:

he estimated that "three quarters of the enployment in

the United Stntes affiliated firss is concentrated in industries where
the five largest competitors supply 80'.i~ or r'.10re of the toto.l output.;,
Other studies in Canada, Europe,
.

,C:fa.:

Australi~, point in the same direc-

tion, though they are less conclusive.

4

Though the United States is the home of nany of the largest multinational firms, several Crmadian and European firms also have suhstantial direct foreign investments.

Surprisingly, when these foreign based

multinational firms invest in the United States, they frequently choose
the very same industries as Ar.1ericans do \.'11cn investinr, abroad.

Petro

leum products, biscuits, concentrated mill: products, soft drinks, paper
products, soaps, farm nachincry, busi;:1ess machines, tires and tubes,
and sewing machines are c1ll exo.□ples of industries where American firms

have substantial direct investI;1.ent i:lbro.:id, \lhile one of the leading firms
operating in the United States is a Subsidiary of a foreign

fir □.
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He might note finally that much of the present direct investment
is of long-standing duration.

:,ost of the firms now prominent date

the beginnings of their foreign .:::ctivities to before 1914 and often
to before 1900.

In the United I~ingdor.1, for exar.,plc, where the best

historical information is available, fully one-half of the employment
in the United States controlled enterprises in 1957 Has in firms esta-

.

blished before 1914.

5

The 1957 census of United States foreign business

investtr.ents shm-1ed that 651: of the total investment nt that tir.1e was

concentrated in plants that uere e~,tablished in 1946.

Since feu plants

were established either during the Depression cir the ;far, most of these
plants were established at lc.::i.st before 1930, and many ,,ell before that.
Direct investment by foreigners in the United States also appears to
be in old, uell-establishcd subsidiaries, almost 80% of the investment
is in enterprL,es established before 1941 .::i.nd nuch of this doubtlessly
dates fron a considerably earlier period.

6

Once a direct investr::ent

is established, it appenrs to grou along ,:ith its industry; judging from
this history, a firm thinkinr about foreirn operations should do so
with a long horizon in mind.

- 5 II

Hany of the sc:1me factors enter into a firms decision to expand its
boundaries across an international frontier as enter into its decision
to expand within a country, but there arc also a nur.iber of special prob
lems arising fron the fact the attivities are international \lhile firms
are national.

He night begin uith a brief discussion of these legal,

political, linguistic and cultural factors uhich by and large militate
against direct control in favor of indirect control and explain to some
extent why international business inter;ration is considerably less devel
oped than national integration.
The most obvious deterrent to direct foreign investment is ~ck of
ififormation on the foreiGn econony, its lanr.;uage, its law, and its politics.

Initially at least, an L\nerican firn attemptir,g to operate abroacl

is likely to find itself at a competitive disadvantage relative to local
firms - or in the case of colonial depcnderrcies, relative to firms from
the parent country - and there arc obvious benefits fron atter.ipting to
cooperate with better placed firms ro.ther than supplanting them. 7

To

some extent, the disadvanta~e of bcin~ a foreigner can be offset by
filling managerial positions in forci~n countries ui th nationals of the

country in question, but this requires important innovntions in the or
ganization of the firm, for a man effective in one country because he
is a citizen, may not be effective ir, o. top management post of a multi
national firm.

Balancing the nee<.2 to 2.c..iapt to loco.l circumsto.nces uith

the centralizing requirement of international coordination will provide
a continual source of stress uithin the ·::ulti112tion.'.ll firm.
Discriminatory treo.tnent by governments also favors indirect cooper
ation rather than direct mmershin, since nost ,:,;overnrnents attcrapt to
protect their firms from the compcti tion of forci:-;ners.

Even '.1here such
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deliberate discrimination is absent, the multinational firm has the
inherent disadvantage of falling ~-.Ti thin

the legal jurisdiction of more

than one country and being subject to more th2.r1 one set of legal con
straints.

An American firn operating in a foreign country must ol>ey

American laws as well as local laws - a disadvantagC! the local firm
does not have.

An international code of lau uhich uould reconcile even

some of the more obvious conflicts is still a long uay in the making.
Lastly, the difficulty of converting currency from one country to
another provides an important deterrent to c1irect investment.

An American

firm pays its shareholders in terms of dollars and must measure its
profits in terms of dollars; uhen investinr:: abroo.<l, it must attach a
risk premium to cover possible ch.:mges in the exc:1ange rate or other
difficulties of transferrinr, its funds out of the foreign country.

In

order to cover this risL premiun, the rate of return to a multinational
firm must accordingly be higher th2n that required for a purely national
firm, and this favors indirect rati er tlwn (iirect relationships.
1

-- 7 ·III

Hhy do firms still find it profitabl e to make direct investmen ts
with all their attendant difficult ies?
of using internati onal markets.

One reason may be the high cost

Suppose a firm is consideri ng how

best to utilize abroad some advantage it possesses in productio n or
marketing , for example, a patent, a different iated product, a superior
technique , or better access to capital and other factors of productio n.
If the advantage is specific and uell define,: it may be feasible to
license or othenlise sell it to an independe nt foreip1 firm and thereby
avoid the difficult ies of acquiring om,crship of the foreicn enterpris e.
But if the advantase is complex and diffuse, it ~ay not be possible to
arrive at a sales agreement specifyin g exactly t1hat is being sold and
on what rerr;is.

For example, if the foreign enterpris e needs manageria l

and technical help on call to deal uith a wide variety of problems as
they eraerge, it may be impossibl e to ::wt doun in adv2.nce exactly uhat

help the Anerican firm is expected to give and uhat remunerat ion it \Jill
receive in each instance.
into?

long-ter□

Instead it raay be more efficient to enter

contract in t~ich profits from co-operat ion are shared

, and the decision handled a<l□inistrctively rather than b2rgained for in
each case.

As Coase put it,
The iristitutio n of the firr~ r,reatly reduces the need
to specify prices in e~1ch of the many transactio ns
that occur because one long tern contract is substi
tuted for a series of short ones. Instead of bargainin z
each day over the terms on uhici1 fnctors are employed
and physical resources are usec2, an aljreemei;t covering
a long period is reached w:1ich settles terms of remun
eration nnd gives to the coordinat or the authority to
direct the use of co-oncrat ing elements in an optimal
fashion. The fin, is thus -'.ctn instrumen t for economizi ng
on Darket costs.8

A second reason, sugsested by Coase, is discrimin atory governmen t

policy.

Firms may be created in order to escnpe governmen t regulatio n

because "exchange transactio ns on a Eiar!:et nncl the same transactio ns

,--,
V

within a firm are often treated differen tly by governm ents or other
bodies with regulato ry powers." 9
certain practice s such as price

In the antitrus t laus, for example,
discri □ ination

are prohibit ed if they

result from a collusiv e agreeme nt ~-7ith a foreign enterpri se but will
escape regulati on if the a~reeme nt is between branches of the same
multina tional firm.

Another instance stCinS from the fact that the tax

liabilit y of a firm may depend upon its forri of organiz ation.

In

some cases, of course, the discrim ination nay go t:1e other uay and fa-

var indirec t relation ship; a forei3n governm ent may have a more lenient
foreign exchange policy on royaltie s paid abroad them upon dividend s
to cite one possible case.
A third conside ration is uncerta inty ,::md the possibi lity of diversificati on.

A merger of enterpr ises ,:hose profits are inversel y corre-

lated uill result iE a more st2ble combined profit stream, since ran<lorn effects Hill tend to cancel eac;, other.

Such negative correlat ion

is almost ah-mys present bet1. eer: the Luyers and sellers of a product,
1

since a price change that ;mrts one of ther,1 henfi ts the ot:1er.

In the

case of selling an advo.nt.'.:!ge discusseC : above this conside ration enters

as follous; in order to decide the price. at which the adv.:-mtage is to
be sold, a calculat ion must be made on expecteu future use and re.venue.
But this can be. done only imperfe ctly and the errors effect the buyer
and seller in opposite uays.

If the realized revenue exceeds the ex-

pected, the buyer gains and the seller loses, if the realiz2d falls
short of the. expected , the seller gains and the buyer loses.

Direct

investm ent is one: way to minimize . the cost of uncertia nty since it provides for sharing of profits anu thus

.:1

certian degree of insuranc e.

The diversif ication factor is particul o.rly importan t in the case
of direct investm ent in foreign rc:n· rc1aterL::,l producti on.

Comr.1odity
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markets are notoriously unstable and a firm heavily dependent on raw
materials is often in a highly vulnerable position.

If it must buy the

raw material in the open market, it'will be subject to great fluctua
tions in profits as the commodity market fluctuates between scarcity
and plenty.

This instability is at least partly reduced by dire ct

investment, because what the firm loses as manufacturer when prices

rise is to some extent offset by what it gains as. producer, and vice
versa for price falls.

The diversification motive is, however, on a

different footing than other motives because it does not require mer
ger of the separate enterprises.

Each shareholder of the firm can sta

bilize his own earning to whatever degree he desires by buying an appro
priate mixture of shares in the companies specializing in different
lines.

But particularly in the case of foreign trade, where informa

tion is very poor, it may be easier for management, via direct invest
ment, to diversify for its shareholders.
Imperfect competition, resulting from fewness of firms, provides
a fourth reason for direct investment.

In international markets where

there are a large number of competitors, a firm can be reasonably sure
it is receiving or paying a competitive price.

In these cases, it is

resonable to accept the market price and use the market to effect its
transactions.

But when numbers are few, the firm cannot rely on the

market forces but must bargain with its oligopolistic competitors over
price; direct ownership of a foreign enterprise is one of the strategies
at its command.
For example, consider again the firm selling an advantage.

To some

extent it is a monopolist with respect to that advantage; whether it is
profitable to use a market or to engage in direct investment depends
on whether it is also selling to r.ionopsonists'Jr to a large number of
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competitive buyers.

In figure lA WlP is the value of the marginal pro

duct of the advantage (the marginal physical product of the advantage
times the price of the cmmnodity in whose production the patent is used.)
If there are a large number of buyers, it is also the demand curve for
the patent; competition of many small producers will drive abnormal
profits to zero, and the price of every factor of production, including
that of the patent, will be bought into equality with the value of its
marginal product.

Given this der.1and curve, '(and assuming for simplicity

that the marginal cost of the patent is zero), the mmer of the patent
will charge ex for it, the user nill produce output Q, the marginal re
venue product will be zero, i.e., equal to marginal cost, and the quasi
rent of the patent Hill be at a maximum.
However, if there is only one or a few buyers of the advantage in
each country, this analysis will not hold.

The buyer(s) will not com

pete to drive their profits to zero, but will adopt some different stra
tegy.

Suppose, for example, there is only one buyer, who acts as a

naive Bertrand monopsonist and attempts to maximize his profits subject
to the price set by the seller.

In this case lie will equate the price

of the advantage to its n,:irginal revenue product (marginal physical
product times marginal revenue) rather than to the value of the marginal
product as before.

The demand curve facing the owner of the advantage

is then no longer VMP but NRP.

The optimal price for the patent re

mains at alpha (this is an arbitrary outcome due to the assumption that
the demand curve is linear), but production will now occur at Q'.

The

quasi rent for the patent is reduced by cx(Q-Q'), while the profits
earned at the manufacturi ng stage rise froPl zero to (13-a)Q'.

The motive

for branch plant ownership comes from the dead ,-,eight loss in global
profits resulting fror.1 a movement from Q to Q'.

The increase in profits

:::'IGlF.B 1A

VHP.:.volue of the marginal
product of patent
lfil:nar~inel revenue
product of patent
1-Itm.P=norginol nor~inol
revenue p::toduct
a(,. =-i:,iricc c:1nrgod for

p2tcnt

ct

'"-,
,::::__...___.._ _._____.1---_,_--~

Viir=voluc of the ,or[;inol ,_,reduct of bou:=ite in
production o:2 aluninun
~TJ'.anorginol revenue product
iIC=nore;inol cost
~ 1JT'J'.-,n;ire;inol ·:1orr:;innl revenue product
o ~price of br.m::ite
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to the manufacturi ng stage, under the assumption that it is monopolisti c,
is less than the loss of quasi rents to the owner of the patent; if the
patentee is able to obtain ounership and direct control cf the manufac
turer, it can restore the output to Q and maximize profits.

This is,

of course, a highly simplified description of the problem of selling
a patent; but increased complexity, though it increases relevance, will
not alter the fundamental point that there is an advantage to removing
bilateral oligopoly.
Another case of vertical integration , identical in principle to
the case of the patent just described, but somewhat more complex, occurs
when a raw material is produced and used in oligopolist ic industries.
To simplify the exposition, we may call the rau material bauxite, and
the manufacture d product, aluminum.

The analysis is not entirely irrle

vant to these industries, but the choice is intended primarily for illus
tration and should not be interpreted literally.

In figure 2A, VHP is

the values of the marginal product of bauxite in the production of alum
inum, while NC is the marginal cost curve of producing aluminum, assumed
for simplicity to be constant.

If there is perfect competition in both

the bauxite and the aluminum industries, the curves are also the demand
and supply curve of bauxite, and production will occur at their inter
section Q.

\Je are interesteJ, however, in the case Hhere each stage

of production is monopolized .

Assume first that the aluminum producer

is a monopolist while the bauxite industry is perfectly competitive .
The aluminum producer will equate the price of bauxite to the marginal
revenue product rather than the value of the marginal product and pro
duction will be restricted to Q'.
is also monopolized .

Nou suppose that bauxite production

The bauxite producer might then take the marginal

revenue product curve (HRP) as the demand curve for bauxite, and charge

- 12 a to maximize its profits at the point where production is Q" and the
marginal marginal revenue product (lllIRP) equals the cost of producing
bauxite.

As in the case of the patent, this sequential monopoly pat

tern reduces total profit and provides an incentive for international
integration through br::.nch plant ounership in order to maximize global
profits.
An incentive for direct investment also arises in cases of hori-

zontal oligopoly.

A firi:1 in an industry that is highly concentrated

here and abroad will find itself in oligopolistic competition with its
domestic and foreign rivals.

Since the number of firms is few, they

are likely to recognize their mutual interdependence and engage in oli
gopolistic rivalry, one form of which is direct investment.

In the

limit, one could imagine that one firr:i, through direct investment, acquires ownership of all the firms in the industry and with complete
world-wide control fully maxireizes global profits.

This would result

in perfect co-ordination and the highest profit possible.

Typically,

however, international business integration is far less conplete; several
large firms, a few from the United States and perhaps one or two from
Europe compete and collude througbout the world through intern.'.l~ional
trade and investment,

The amount of direct foreign ilwestment a firm

should make will then depend not only on its cor..petitive position bu.t

also on its aggressiveness and that of its rivals.
An interestin~ example of hou this Harks in practice is found in
the following old, but still relevant, case study.
'' ... at the turn of the century, the liritish tobacco
industry was literally 'invaded 1 Ly American capital.
Restricted in its sales by a high tariff wall imposed
on U.S. cigarettes, the American Tobacco Company ac
quired the young and prosperous firQ of Ogdens, Ltd.
in September, 1901, and straight away launched an ex
tensive publicity campair,n to sell cheap cigarettes.
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The Chairman of the U.S. company at that time made no
secret of his intensions, viz:
'to obtain a large share
of the tobacco trade both of England and the Continent,'
and he threatEned to spend up to b 6 million in doing
this. The reaction of the British producers was prompt,
for within a month of the purchase of Ogden's, thirteen
of the leading tobacco companies had amalgamated and
formed themselves in Imperial Tobacco Company, ~.Jith an
issued capital of b 14 1/2 million. Then followed sev
eral months of cut-throat conpetition between the two
concerns ••. Eventually, a market sharing agreement w-as
reached in September, 1902; Ogden's became part of the
Imperial Tobacco group, Hhich was given the monop<'lly of
the British and Irish markets, l,,hilst the United States
and its dependencies were to be supplied by the American
Tobacco Company. A neu concern, the L>ritish-America n
Tobacco Co., Ltd. , mis set to handle the remainder of the
export business with allocated factories both in the United
States and in the United Kinedou ... lo
A firm's international operations depend therefore on trials of

strength as well as objective factors suc11 as cost and demand condi
tions.

It may agree with other firms to divi~e markets according to

spheres of interest (for instance, the Ar!!erican firms restricting them
selves to Latin America, the European to Asia and Africa, and all compe
ting in Canada), or it may co-operate more closely and establish joint
ventures, or it may clash sharply Pith other firms and establish its
own branch plant in every market of adequate size.

Predatory competi-

tion will not usually last for lonr,; more than likely, after a while,
a certain stability will be achieved and the industry will s~ttle into
some market sharing pattern.

However, at present, there are great strains

on the prevailing patterns due to the removal of trade barriers and
the opening up of new markets in underdeveloped countries, and there is
something of a scramble for CTarkets occurring 2.s each firm tries to
establish a. base for future grm,th.

A fini tllinking of foreign operations

should not for~et the advantages that sometimes follou from jumping quick
ly.
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The motives for international integration just discussed have a
direct bearing on the question of hm-1 l>est to finance foreign opera
tions.

A firm engaging in international operations can raise funds for

its foreign subsidiary locally in the country of operation or else
supply capital from the parent office.

In deciding the appropriate

ratio between local borrowing and direct investment, a firm should not
only consider interest charges and terms of repayment in each capital
market, but also the special problems associated uith internationality

and.the need for control.
The basic pattern of financing direct investment is illustrated in
Figure 2 and Table 1.

In Figure 2a

\IC

see that on average United States

firms with t'ranch plants abroad finance about 60 per cent of total assets
from the United States, uhile borrm:ing about 40 per cent locally in
the country of operation.

Figures 2b and 2c, however, shm-: that American

firms make a sharp distinction betueen ee:uity and non-equity capital.
The United States share of equity capital averages &5 per cent while the
share of non-equity capital is only 25 per cent.

The reluctance to sell

equity securities abroad is futther illustrated in Figures 2d and 2e
which shm-1 that fin".ls on average finance only about o per cent of total
assets through equity securities, in contrast to about 31 per cent in
the form of creditor capital.
Foreign firms investing in the United States follow similar rules
of finance as is illustrated in Tal;le I; they '.1old nearly all the equity
securities of their subsidiaries themselves, ,,bile borrowing a large
part of non-equity securities in the United States, which, to them, is
the foreign country.
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In contrast to Hhat these tables s10

1
;,,,

one might have expected that

American firms would raise all funds required for foreign operations
in the United States and avoid, as r.mch as possible, borrowing in for
eign countries.

The United Stotes is the richest country in the world

~nd has one of the most highly developed systems of financial intermedi
aries; it is usually thought to be one of the cheapest places to raise
capital.

Since those American firms large enough to have substantial

foreign investments usually have well established access to this rela
tively cheap source of funds there uoulcl seem to be no point in looking
elsewhere for finance.

Indeed one might even hypothesize that some firms

would go beyond their traditional activities and, acting as financial
intermediaries, use their :•;e,•1 Yorl:_ connections to raise funds in the
United States to lend to unaffili.a tcd fcreir;n concerns.

Lut the evidence

does not seem to support this view.
Exchange rate risks probably olay

2m

importan': role in explaining

r:hen comparinr, the costs of borrowing

why firms prefer to borrow abroad.

at home to the cost of borrm-1iri1-3 abroad, L1e firm must add a risk pre
mium to the home interest rate and in the usual case this uell outweigh
any initial difference in interest rates that might have existed.

If

we let r equal the capital costs of borrm?ing in America, r' the capital
cost of borrmving abroad, and t the risk premium, the fin:1 bases its
decision to borrow on whether
>
<

r + t "" r' .
Although it might seem that little could lJe s;:iid a priori about which

will be greater, in fact there is a presumption that the left hand side
exceeds the right, i.e., that the cost of borrowing at home will be greater
than the cost of borrowing abroad.

This is because international arbi-

- lf, -

trage will ensure that the interest rates in tuo countries does not
differ by more than the cost of professional arbitrage.

Letting~ equal

this cost, then typically,
r + a > r' .
The primary occupations of firms

with direct foreign investments

are mining, manufacturing, or distributior., and not finance:

in the

difficult act of arbitrage they are likely to be at a comparative dis
advantage relative to the banks anc other financial institutions which
specialize in these activities.

It is likely therefore that t i s greater

than a and therefore that (r + t) is grenter than (r + a) nnd a fortiori
greater tahn r'.

It will pay the firi:i., then, to borrm, abroad.

There

may, of course, be exceptions; some large international firms, at a given
point of time, may have better facilities for transferring capital between
two countries than financial firms, but 1:y and large this will not be
true, and it Hill pay firms to leave arl:iitrage to the arbitrageurs.
vision of labor applies here as elseuhere.

Di

The firm is well advised

to minimize its uncovered foreign investment to the greatest extent pessible.
Notice that the same principles apply to firms investing in the
United States.

They too should borrm1 locally, if they can, and avoid

taking a position.

TI1us to a multinational firm, the question of where

-capital is cheapest, ;i.s not sfr,T)ly

_cl.

but depends also on.its national~ty.

CJUestion of prevailing interest charges
There is a sort of -relativistic effect,

each firm finds it profitable to borrm-J, for its foreig-n enterprises, in
the country of operations.
BofroHing costs•modify, but do not re-verse,. the above analy?is.
speaking_, r' is the J:"nte of return qn lonns r1ade in foreign countries··
t-1hile the relevant consideration for the firm is the amount

Strictly

17
it pays as borrower which exceeds r' by the cost of borrowing, b', the size of which depends on particular circumstances.

If borrowing

costs abroad are very high, it r.-iay lead a firm to finance part of its
foreign business uith capital from home.
Figure 3 illustrates the critical rate of borrowing costs.

The

cost of borrowing abroad is tl1e sum of ~. the prime interest, plus
~. the cost of borrm,ing.

It is assumed in the diagram that borrouing

costs per unit rise uith increased borrowing:

at first the firm makes

use of short-tern finance (bank credit, trade loans, etc.) but as these
easy sources are exhausted, costs rise.• and the curve has in general an
upward slope.

The cost of borrm?ir.;:; ir: the United States is the sum

of three factors:

tbe prime rate of interest at home, .E., the risk pre

mium!_, and borrowing costs 12_, Hhic:h are specific to a particular firm.
All these are assumed to be constant for simplicity (a reasonable assump
tion, perhaps, if the branch plant is small relative to the size of the
total parent firm).

The level, however, will depend on the particular

firm involved, since clue to a host of considerations a firm may either
be able to obtain funds in the United States at close to the prime in
terest rate, or else have to pay consideraLly more.

The proportion

borrowed locally and the proportion financed from the United States de
pend upon where the

ti-10

top curves intersect.

The point of intersec

tion depends upon the rate at 1-Ihich borrowing costs abroad rise, which
in turn is determined by the state of the capital market in the foreign
country.

In most underdevelopec.l countries, once the easy sources of

bank credit are exhausted there is usually little scope for further bor
rowing, and the r' + b' curve be cones hi~hly j_nelastic.

In r.1.ore highly

developed countries, the slope is r:iore gradual and for this reason American
firms are able in Europe to borrm; a ilighcr per cent of t'i.wir subsidiaries 1
needs than they can in Canada or in unclerdeveloped countries.

FIGlJTIJ""":; 3

r'

+ b'

r + t + b

r + t
r'

r

Q borrowed
r = prime rate of interest in the United States
r 1 = prime rate of interest abroad
t = transactions 1 cost on foreign investment
b = borrowing costs in the United States
b'= borrowing costs abroad

V

The above argument suggested a firm will typically find it profit
able to maximize local borrowing subject to the constraint of rising
borrowing costs.

In addition there is a further perh2ps more important

constraint stemming f-.:-om the need to m£,intain near complete ounership
of equity securiti~s.

Because of the special disadvantag es of selling

equity. securities, financial_ flexibility is severely con~.tra.ined .

In the first

place the parent firm will usually want to maintain control over the
foreign enterprise and thus raust hold 51 per cent (Less in some cases)
of equity securities.

I-Io:;::e importar-.t,

~orld-wide profits,

most firms ,;.;ill '!ant to hold a much higher share

than chat.

in order to

fully

nnxir.dzc

If a firm sells equity securities ~nits foreign operation,

some method ,d.l~- have to be 1:or!:"'c1 out to determine the slwre of profits
earned by the subsidiary.

This \:~_11 be exceedi:1gly difficult to do.

Part of the profi~s of the su~sidiary comes fros its affiliation Pith
the parent firms and the tcc:m:.c~,l, financial., and ma~1c1gcrial advice it

is entitled to.

Strictly speaki:1:;

::113 affiJ.iai:e shoulrl be ciwrged for

these services and tLe amount dedu,.:t1c:.ci i:i:-orn ]}l'ofi'.:"s.
is reasonable?

:_;ut what charge

Reca1~- tl1ctt Lie r.-e0.sor, di.rc_t umc,rship uas chosen over

an indirect relationf'hip uas p:::-ecis~1-y uccam~e it ·:,2s difficult br in
efficient to use the marl.et to hancl"u2 transactior: s,

1.

difficult or impossible :::o find an &ppropriate p·d.ce.
culties apply to distrituting ~refits

e. Lecause it uas
The same diffi-

Tl1c profits of a firm with world-

wic:ie enterprises are :i.nter<lepend ent 2nd cannot :)e allocated to any parti
cular subsection; st10uld

2.

firm allmJ locc1l participatio n, it micht re

introduce some of the very conflicts direct investment is designed to
avoid.

Local shareholder s, interested only in the profit of their parti

cular subsidiary, would not take into consideratio n the repercussio n of

- 19 their policies on branch plants in other countries.

Haximization of

global profits, the goal of direct investment, will be frustrated.
We may state the argument more precisely as follows:

direct

investment occurs because the profits of an enterprise in one country,
n , are dependent on the profits of an enterprise in another country,

1

To maximize global profits (n
(2)

1
d

+
-1r

n ) the following must hold:
2

1

c:;

-1.

TI,-,
L

Suppose, however, that the fin.1 fro11 country 1 mms only A per cent of
the enterprise in country 2.

Then, it will r:1axi1~lize (n

1

+ 'An ) which
2

occurs uhen
(3)

which only partially. exp·toi"ts global inte---r.d·epcndence wlten ;\ <loes not
equal 1.

9

A few exar..ples will illustrate t\1e conflict between the interna

tional parent firm and the local investor.
ciding whether or not to expand output in

Consider a parent firm de

A,

its lmv-cost partially-m-med

subsidiary, or to contract it i.n _[, its high-cost fully-ouned one.
Concentration of production in the lm-1-cost plant uould increase total
profits, but the firm shares the gain in profits in~ uith local share
holders, while it stands tbe loss in 1:; alone.

Hhat is best for global

profits will not be best for its mm profits.

If, on the other hand, it

owned both plants fully, it uould be free of ti.1is contradiction and could
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maximize total profits.

The corollary of this is thnt a local investor

would be unwilling to participate in a venture with an internation al
firm which has the power to siphon off the profits of this joint ven
ture to one' of its wholly ouned subsidiarie s located elsewhere.
A similar problem arises in the cases of vertical integration and
may be illustrated by using the e:i-:araple of a firm selling a patent.
The real marginal cost of using the patent is zero.

To maximize global

profits, then~ the branch plants should use the patent up to the point
where the marginal revenue product equals zero.
be allocated bet\·1een enterprises ?

Dut hcilu will profits

If there are local shareholder s in

the foreign country, the profits accruing to the branch plant must be
separated from the profits of the parent firm:
must be used to value the patent.

to do so, some price

Dut if a price is charged, r.ianagers,

attempting to maximize profits of the hranch plant, uill accordingly
economize on the use of the patent.
total profits lowered.

Production will be restricted and

The parent fir~ will bear the loss unless it

removes the conflict by buying out the local slrnl'.'eholder s.

•

In conclusion, we r.iight summarize out' analysis of financial strategy
as follows.

Under normal circumstanc, ~s a firn would like to minimize

its net investment in any country by borrowing locnlly to the amount
of its foreign assets in that country.

It is constrained from doing so

first by high borrowing costs resulting from in~erfectio ns in the capital
marl:et and second by the disadvantag es of sellin2, equity securities.
We note that the louer nre interest rates ::md Liorrm1ing costs abroad,
the less burdensome to the firm will be the charges on capital raised
locally, and the more profitable the enterprise.

Cheap capital in a

country therefore tends to attract i~t~rnation al operations because of
the leverage it provides the parent firm.
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VI
He have tried in this paper, to look at optimal internatio nal
industria l organizat ion from the point of view of the firm.

For

illustrat ive purposes He relied heavily on the example of a firm selling
an advantage but it should be clear that the major findings are not
limited to that case.

.

It should also be noticed that in some of the

examples cited, the most profitabl e choice to the firm would not be
the optimal one from the poir,t of vieH of the nation.

In particula r,

where internati onal business inte::;rati on has as its purpose or effect
increased monopoly power a serious antitrust problem may arise; in the
future governmen t action to counterva il this type of direct investmen t
may be an increasinr .;ly importar,t 2spcct of internati onal operation s.
He f'light also note the possibili ty tl1at it may sometimes pay governmen ts
to mate direct investmen ts.

For example, some agricultu ral commoditi es prora

inent in internati onal trade are grmm !Jy a large number of small producers
and sold to a highly concentra ted m2nufactu ring industry.

The producing

countries could prob~lly increase their share of revenue if they formed a

•

selling cartel to counterva il the monopsony of the buyers.

Even if feasible,

this solution is non-optim al because it involves the wastes of sequentia l
monopoly.

It is not possible in this case for firms to integrate bacla1ard

through direct investn1en t hecause there arc too many smGll sellers but it
might be possible for countries to integrate fon.1ard by aquirin1; control
of some of the enterpris es in the i,uyinr country that manufactu re .::rn.d
distribut e their product.

Thin ,1oulcJ not only remove the ,-mste.s of bar

gaining but also enable more ration.'.ll plo.1,niw:.
turer Hho decides on mnrl-_et promotion counts as
producer price thnt results

frr,rn

;r,,--.-r-,-,,:,orl

For example, the manufac
2.

cost the increase in

r10m,:,--l

Huc.h of th.is orice

increase is a rent to the producers and fron the point of view of the

- 22 producing countries should be maxirizcd, not EJ.iEimized.
gration could accom-rlish this.
stability Hould J;e rnitip;ated.

Fonmrd inte·

In ac'.c1itio,,, tl:e nrol,len' of price in
T'-1e fluctuatior: s

of short term shifts of inelzstic clemc1.ncl

.:1r;c

j_!-:

,,rice as a result

supply schedule m.erely

transfer incofTle from producer to cor_c.t1r1er l:encfittinr>; no one and causinr,
uncertainty for botr1.

'~ith vert:Lc.::iJ. i:,t,-:,r,rat:i.01: , t~ic cost of the instc1-

since firm::; inte,.,.rate bachmrc~ for these re.:1sor,s _ it nay h:! ~:orthwhile
for countries to intogr2tc fon1ard.

Perli.::q,:, underdevelop ed countries;

to solve some of their problens .::.s :,rimary producinr, nations, should
make direct investnents 2s ucll a:; receive t;:cn.
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* Hy thinking on this subject has been ~reatly influenced by Professor
C.P. Kindleberger who first suggested b1e topic to me and thereafter as
teacher and thesis adviser continuously shapeci its development.
R.H. Coase, "The Ho.tu re of the Firr:1," Econonica, i:Jew Series, Vol. IV,
(1937). pp. 386-405. Reprfr.. tecl i_rc Sti'.:';ler and Doulding A2A Readings in
Price Theory, pp. 331-351.
1.

2. United States Department of Commerce, United States Business Invest
ment in Foreisn Countries, \fashington: Government Printer, 195 7, p. 144.
3. The list of firms '.-1as obtained from an investigation of annual reports
and SEC registration forms and c01np2reci for coverage with the aggregate
figures published by the Departraent of Comraerce. Though it is somewhat
out of date, it is doubtful that the features referred to have changed
significantly. Asset size was obtained frora the 1961 Fortune Directory
and refers to 1964. Concentration ratios \Terc taken frm:i the U.S. Senate,
Concentration in American Industry, Report of the Subcommittee on Anti
trust and Honopoly pursuant to S. Res. 57 (b5th Con~ress),. Table 17,
p. 23. The firms were classified according to their major product, but
their direct investments are often restricted to one or two specialties
in which the firm has particular 2dvantages. Concentration ratios in
these specialties are typically much hirher: a better industry defini
tion would therefore shou an even stronger association bett·Jeen invest
ment and high concentration. Horeover, many firms were in industries
where product differentiation was inportant anc; \·1here the concentration
ratio is a poor index of rnar1:et position because of the difficulty of
defining an industry. The classification of firms was as follmis.
25-49% Concentration
50-74% Concentration
75-100% Concentration
Heat Products
Dairy Products
Canned Fruits% Vegs.
Flou & Heal
Cement
Refractories
Surgical Appliances
Mattresses & Iled Springs
Medicinal, Chaemical, ~
Pharmaceutical
Preparations
Paints & Varnishes
Tractors & Farm
Machinery
Oil Field Machinery &
Tools
Printing Trade Equip
ment & Hachinery·

4
2
3

1
1
1
1
1

Biscuits & Crackers
Corn Het :Tilling
Abrasives
Asbestos
Photo8ra~hic Equipment
Cleaninr, & Polishing
Soaps & Glycerine
Plumbing fixtures
Elevators & Escalators
Vacuum Cleo.ncrs

6
1

1
1
l
1
1
2

2
1
1
11

5
1
1
20

Cereal, Dreakfast Foods
Cheuing Gum
Flavoring for Soft
Drinks
llard Sruface Floor
Coverings
Tires & Inner Tubes
Flat Glass
Tobacco
Aluminum
Tin Cans & Other Tinware
Razors & Razor Blades
Cornputinr, Hachines &
Typewriters
Seuing llachines
Shoe Hachir..ery
Ilotor Vehicles
Locomotive & Parts

One firm, Construction & Jlinin~ Machinery, ,:as in industry ~1i th less than
25% concentration, for THenty-six ot',er,;, it ,;;us not possL;le to assign
coneP.ntr:iti0n r;:iti_o~

cl- 1 e.

to thP

,..1--:'~Tr)"Y""r-.;-f-in.-l

l'"'~~ ...

yo~ ,1\,-'7

f-"!"""\ .....

.::-:vmc;.

2
2

3

1
5

1
1
1
2

1
4
1
1
6

1
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4. J.ll. Dunning, American Investments in British ~'.anufacturing Industry,
London: George Allen and Unwin, E•SS, p. 115. .1oreover, this is prob
ably an underestimate, since differentiated products play an important
role in some of the unconcentratec~ industries. foundation garments, pro
prietary medicines, beauty and toilet preparations for example.
See I. Jrecher and S.S. Reisn:an, Canada-United States I.conomic Rela
tions, Ottawa: Royal Commission or, Canada's Economic Prospects, 1957;
F.A. Southard, American Industry in Europe, .Joston: Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1931, (especially his comments or, the electrical equipment industry, p. 36, telephone and telegraphic equipment, p. 55, petroleum, p. 60,
68-69, motor vehicles, p. 29, mines and metals, p. 93, phonoeraphs, p. 108;
and locks and keys, p. 10~)), G.Y. Eertir:, .L'i11vestissement des firmes
estrangeres en France, P.U.f., 1Sl63·. D.T. ;~,rash, United States Investment in Australian Iianufacturinr. Industr'>:_, Doctoral Dissertation, Australian
National University, August, 1965.
5. _Ibid, p. 95. i:1oreover, tbese statistics refer to the date on Hhicl1
the branch plant began operatinf,,
The relevant concept is the date on
which the parent firm first went abroad. If data Here available on this
basis, it would indicate a much srnaller per cent of investment being ac
counted for by new entrants.
6. U.S. Department of Commerce, 1957 Census, .op. cit_.
The 1950 census
found that almost 6C: per cent of the investment at that tir.te Has in
plants established before 1930. Other evidence oc the venerability of
most foreign investors can be found iu tl!e case• l1istories cited in Le,Jis
(1938), Marshall, Southard and Taylor (1936), T'l1elps (19%), Southard
(1931), and Brash (1%5).
U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Jisness Investments in the
United States, 1961.

7. If direct investr:1ent is nonethele:=.;s cho::e:,, the cost of acquiring
information and rnaneuvcr;1bility CclE i1,. part :,e vic:.\!CL in terms of cap
ital theory since some of it is noL-recl!r1·i11g.
Cn,cc. a firm makes the
effort to establish operations iil 2- forcJ;,n couutry, ns r,cmy firms have
done, a stream of future pessiuili.:ies is opc:ne<l ur, and it is their
future benefits which r,ust be wei;~:,te,~ i:; :.:he L,itial ciecisions.
8.

Coase, p.

9.

Ibi4,, p. 335.

10. Dunning, ~- -~it., pp. 30-31. Later tile American Tobacco Company
uas forceo to divest itself of its i11tcrcst i1: t,1is company.
11. 'The analysis assumes firms try to naxir,ize total profits legally
belonging to shareholders in the :-iome country. An alternative assump
tion is that firms vie\1 all divi2ends, including those paid to share
holders in the home country as a cost an('. atteopt to TI'.axir,1ize retained
earnings.
Letting d 1 and d2 Le divicienc.is paid in country land country
2 respectively, the firm maximizes (n1 + n 2 - d 1 , - d 2 ) instead of (n1 - An 2 )
as above. Provided dividends in e2ch country do not depend on profits
earned in that country, i.e., they depend onl7 on total profits and the
conditions prevailing in the capital market i11 each country, equity securi
ties introduce no distortion in the production decision of the type
described above result.
I an grateful to Lr. L. Penrose for this point.

-· 25 TABLE 1
UNITED STATES A~m FOREirn PATTim.NS or,
FIHANCHiG DIRECT rnvESTHK,:Ts

Direct Investment liy u. s.
in Foreign Countries (1957)
(2er cent of)

Direct Investment by
Foreigners in U.S. (1959)
(Der cent of)

Equity
Capital

Debtor
Capital

Capital

Equity
Capitnl

Debtor
Capital

U.S. Share

86

25

61

14

Sl

50

Non U.S. Share

14

75

39

G6

19

50

100

100

100

lOU

100

100

All

All

Capital

SOURCE: United States Dep2rtr1ent of CornT!lcrce, U.S. Business Invest
ments in Foreign Countries: Census ·of 1957, and Forei~n Business
Investments in the United States.
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